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legal issues
The Supreme Court 
considered the issue 
of affi  rmative action 
in admission policies 
yet again.
Affi  rmative Action Returns
to the Supreme Court
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.
One of the most hotly contested issues in education during the past-half century is affi rma-tive action, also known as 
race-based admissions policies. Supporters 
defend the practice as one designed to take 
“affi rmative” steps to eliminate the pres-
ent effects of past discrimination. Critics 
respond that these policies do not address 
how granting preferences today remedies 
past harms, especially because individuals 
who are passed over when affi rmative action 
is applied played no role in creating past 
inequities.
Insofar as debate over affi rmative action 
has heated up yet again, this column briefl y 
examines the history of Fisher v. University 
of Texas II (2016) wherein the Supreme 
Court upheld the University of Texas’s 
reliance on race in admissions. Then, the 
column focuses on the impact affi rmative 
action can have on K–12 schools, refl ecting 
on the meaning of Fisher II for school busi-
ness offi cials, their boards, and other educa-
tional leaders.
Fisher v. University of Texas
In the past, as part of seeking admission at 
the University of Texas (UT), applicants 
were subjected to two different processes. 
The fi rst process was governed by Texas’ 
Top 10 Percent Law, which was designed 
to increase minority enrolments by granting 
automatic admissions to minorities graduat-
ing in the top 10% of their classes (Texas 
Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803(a-1) 2015). This 
process, adopted as the Top Ten Percent 
Plan (TTPP) at UT, does not take race into 
consideration. Using this plan, UT offi cials 
fi lled “up to 75 percent of the places . . . [a 
percentage] which has now been fi xed by 
statute” (Fisher II, p. 2206).
Following the Supreme Court’s 2003 
judgment in Grutter v. Bollinger (2002) that 
affi rmed the University of Michigan Law 
School’s consideration of race in admissions 
in order to achieve diversity, offi cials in 
Texas revised the second admissions process 
to include individualized holistic review. 
Holistic review is a fl exible, individualized 
way to assess an applicant’s capabilities, 
taking into consideration experiences, attri-
butes, and academic metrics.
The fi rst step in the holistic review admis-
sions process at UT requires offi cials to 
develop an Academic Index for applicants 
derived from their scores on the SAT and 
academic performance in high school. 
Next, offi cials develop a Personal Achieve-
ment Index (PAI), which is a numeric score 
derived from student written essays and 
recommendations plus evaluations of their 
leadership skills, records of participation in 
extracurricular activities, awards/ honors 
received, and other special circumstances 
such as socioeconomic status (SES) of appli-
cants’ families and schools as well as race 
to enhance their potential contribution to 
the student body. Using this process, UT 
offi cials perform a full-fi le individualized 
holistic review to admit the remaining 25% 
of their fi rst year classes (Fisher II, p. 2206).
Judicial History
Fisher v. University of Texas was fi led by 
two white female high school graduates who 
were denied entry to the university in the 
fall of 2008 under a policy admitting the top 
10% of graduating classes. The plaintiffs 
alleged that Texas’s Top Ten Percent Law—
designed to increase minority enrollments by 
granting automatic admissions to students 
graduating in the top 10% of their classes—
discriminated against them because of race 
in violation of their right to equal protection 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and fed-
eral statutes.
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One of the students withdrew 
from the case, but Fisher, who 
was in the top 12% of her class, 
remained active in the case even 
though she attended, and graduated 
from, Louisiana State University.
A federal trial court in Texas 
(Fisher 2009) granted UT’s motion 
for summary judgment, essentially 
dismissing the case because it was 
convinced offi cials’ consideration of 
race as a factor in admissions was 
supported by a compelling inter-
est that was narrowly tailored to 
achieve its goal. On further review, 
the Fifth Circuit affi rmed that the 
policy was supported by the com-
pelling interest of achieving a criti-
cal mass of minorities rather than 
outright racial balancing (Fisher 
2011b). Dissatisfi ed with the out-
come, the student appealed to the 
Supreme Court in what is now called 
Fisher I (2013).
In Fisher I, ruling in favor of the 
student, the Supreme Court vacated 
and remanded earlier judgments in 
favor of UT on the basis that the 
Fifth Circuit failed to apply strict 
scrutiny. In mandating the strict 
scrutiny review, the Court directed 
UT offi cials to prove that there was 
no alternative to race-conscious 
admissions plans.
On remand in Fisher I, (2014a) 
paying scant attention to strict scru-
tiny, a divided Fifth Circuit affi rmed 
that UT offi cials demonstrated that 
race-conscious holistic review was 
necessary. Again dissatisfi ed, the stu-
dent appealed to the Supreme Court 
(Fisher I 2015).
Affi rming in favor of UT, Justice 
Kennedy opened the majority opin-
ion in Fisher II (2016) by noting that 
“[t]he Court is asked once again to 
consider whether the race-conscious 
admissions program at the Univer-
sity of Texas is lawful under the 
Equal Protection Clause” (p. 2205). 
Kennedy was joined by Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.
After reviewing the facts, Justice 
Kennedy acknowledged that because 
race seldom provides a rationale for 
treating people disparately, it must 
be justifi ed by a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. Kennedy added 
that if offi cials provide a principled 
explanation of how race contributes 
to creating diverse student bodies, 
they are entitled to deference.
Justice Kennedy observed that the 
admissions program at UT was “sui 
generis,” literally, of its own kind, 
and that insofar as UT was unlike 
other institutions to the extent that 
it used both holistic review and the 
TTTP, even though the latter was 
not at issue, its judgment might have 
limited precedential value.
Finally, Justice Kennedy rebut-
ted four arguments advanced by the 
plaintiff.
1. He rejected the claim that UT 
offi cials failed to articulate the 
need to rely on race.
2. He disagreed with the notion that 
UT no longer needed to use race 
in admissions because it reached 
a critical mass of minorities in its 
student body.
3. He denied the plaintiff’s claim 
that taking race into account was 
unnecessary because it had a min-
imal impact on advancing UT’s 
compelling interest in achieving 
diversity.
4. He rebuffed the plaintiff’s call 
for race-neutral alternatives such 
as SES as unworkable. Kennedy 
feared that if UT adopted the 
plaintiff’s idea by relying on class, 
in the form of SES, in the place of 
race, it “would sacrifi ce all other 
aspects of diversity in pursuit 
of enrolling a higher number of 
minority students” (p. 2213).
Justice Kennedy concluded by 
reminding UT offi cials of their duty 
to continue to refi ne their admissions 
policies to keep them in compli-
ance with the requirements of equal 
protection.
Fisher II provided little guidance to K–12 leaders 
about taking race, or other factors, into consideration 
in pursuit of diversity. However, in light of similar 
pending litigation at Harvard University and the 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill over 
affi rmative action (Lewontin 2016), debate about race-
conscious admissions policies is far from over.
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Reflections
Fisher II is the Supreme Court’s 
most recent opinion on race and 
education but is unlikely to be 
its last. Moreover, Fisher II was 
unusual because it was a four-to-
three judgment following the death 
of Justice Scalia and the recusal of 
Justice Kagan due to her when she 
worked in the United States Depart-
ment of Justice. Justice Thomas filed 
a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Thomas joined.
For supporters of affirmative 
action, the outcome in Fisher II rep-
resents the proverbial half of a loaf. 
The Supreme Court did continue to 
recognize diversity as a compelling 
governmental interest but did not 
endorse affirmative action without 
reservation. Yet, the Court failed to 
provide clear guidance as to how the 
use of race to achieve diversity satis-
fied strict scrutiny.
An important consideration to 
keep in mind is that because UT 
employed both the TTPP and holis-
tic review processes in admissions, 
a combination infrequently used 
at other institutions, the impact of 
Fisher II is unclear for institutions 
of higher education as well as for 
education leaders in K-12 school 
systems.
Fisher II exacerbated confusion 
over the use of race in admissions 
because after Fisher I was remanded 
to the Fifth Circuit with directions 
to subject race-based admissions 
to strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Fisher II also 
paid little heed to this standard. 
Instead, Justice Kennedy relied on 
a variety of rationales inconsistent 
with Fisher I’s directive to apply 
strict scrutiny. Additionally, neither 
the Court nor university officials 
articulated a clear rationale justify-
ing the use of race in admissions.
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion refused to take alternative 
factors such as SES into account in 
admissions. In response to the plain-
tiff’s argument that UT include fac-
tors in addition to race, he thought 
that this approach “ignores the 
fact that the University tried, and 
failed, to increase diversity through 
enhanced consideration of socioeco-
nomic and other factors” (Fisher II, 
p. 2213). 
The Supreme Court’s reluctance 
to include SES aside, it seems that by 
considering this variable when devis-
ing programming for qualified stu-
dents from lower and middle income 
backgrounds, educators may be 
better able to serve the neediest, and 
most deserving, of applicants. Tak-
ing SES into account may also help 
to establish applicant pools that are 
more diverse on a variety of levels in 
K-12 school systems. As such, SES is 
something for education leaders to 
consider when creating programming 
of choice using admissions examina-
tions or where state laws allow them 
to work with charter schools operat-
ing within their districts.
Another benefit of taking SES into 
account is that if used to expand the 
criteria for achieving diversity in stu-
dent bodies via holistic review, then 
affirmative action might become 
more acceptable to its critics by 
expanding the qualifications to help 
to create larger applicant pools. To 
this end, it is unfortunate that in not 
providing clear guidance on the con-
stitutionality of race-based admis-
sions policies, the Fisher II Court 
largely deferred to UT officials.
In the aftermath of Fisher II it 
appears educational institutions can 
continue to rely on race in admis-
sions to foster diversity as long as 
their policies employ genuinely holis-
tic reviews of applications and are 
narrowly tailored to achieve their 
goals. Still, as the Supreme Court 
pointed out in Grutter, programs 
using race in admissions must be 
“flexible enough to consider all per-
tinent elements of diversity in light 
of the particular qualifications of 
each applicant, and to place them on 
the same footing for consideration, 
although not necessarily according 
them the same weight” (p. 337). In 
other words, race can still be used as 
a criterion but not as the sole factor 
in admissions decisions.
Conclusion
Fisher II provided little guidance to 
K–12 leaders about taking race, or 
other factors, into consideration in 
pursuit of diversity. However, in 
light of similar pending litigation at 
Harvard University and the Univer-
sity of North Carolina-Chapel Hill 
over affirmative action (Lewontin 
2016), debate about race-conscious 
admissions policies is far from over.
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